Religious Liberty, Discrimination, and Same-Sex Marriage: Escaping the \u3cem\u3eObergefell\u3c/em\u3e Catch-22 by Bradley, Timothy
Notre Dame Law Review 
Volume 95 Issue 3 Article 8 
3-2020 
Religious Liberty, Discrimination, and Same-Sex Marriage: 
Escaping the Obergefell Catch-22 
Timothy Bradley 
Notre Dame Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
95 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1339 (2020). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Law Review at NDLScholarship. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized editor of NDLScholarship. For more 
information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu. 
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-3\NDL308.txt unknown Seq: 1  6-MAR-20 10:47
NOTES
RELIGIOUS  LIBERTY,  DISCRIMINATION,  AND




In the course of holding that same-sex couples have a constitutional
right to marry, the Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges reassured opponents
of its majority decision that “[m]any who deem same-sex marriage to be
wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged
here.”1  The Court’s opinion was released on June 26, 2015.2  Earlier that
year, the owners of a small pizza parlor in Walkerton, Indiana, became
embroiled in a national media controversy after telling a reporter from half
an hour up the road in South Bend that, if asked to cater a same-sex wedding
ceremony with pizza, they would have to decline because participating in or
facilitating such a celebration would violate their Christian faith.3  In so
declining, Crystal and Kevin O’Connor explained, they would not intend to
discriminate against anyone but would merely seek to operate their business
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; Bachelor of Arts in
Economics and Theology, University of Notre Dame, 2016.  I owe a debt of gratitude to
Gerard Bradley, Michael Bradley, Sherif Girgis, Deion Kathawa, and Zachary Pohlman for
helpful comments on, critiques of, and discussion about this piece and related topics.  I am
also grateful to Rick Garnett for thought-provoking discussions in his seminar on religious
liberty, out of which this Note grew.  A previous, unpublished version of this Note received
second place in the 2019 Religious Liberty Student Writing Competition sponsored by the
J. Reuben Clark Law Society and the International Center for Law and Religion Studies.
The members of Notre Dame Law Review deserve special praise for their careful editing.  All
errors are my own.
1 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
2 Id. at 2584.
3 See RFRA: Michiana Business Wouldn’t Cater a Gay Wedding, ABC57 (Apr. 1, 2015),
https://www.abc57.com/news/rfra-first-business-to-publicly-deny-same-sex-service.
1339
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in a manner consistent with the tenets of their faith.4  The owners further
clarified that they would never refuse service to anyone—gay or straight,
Christian or atheist—who came into their restaurant to eat on account of
their individual identity.5  In other words, the owners simply sought to avoid
complicity with an activity—same-sex marriage—that they deemed immoral,
a falsification of what they understood marriage to be.  Yet the O’Connors
were forced to close their pizzeria for eight days due to the national media
attention, protests, and threats they received after the story broke.6  After
reopening for a few years when the controversy died down a bit, the pizzeria
closed for good in the spring of 2018.7
Episodes like this one call into question whether the majority’s words of
consolation in Obergefell are anything more than a parchment barrier protect-
ing those who dissent from the understanding of marriage ratified in that
decision and who seek to live out that dissent with integrity in their daily lives.
The national reaction to the O’Connors’ hypothetical refusal to serve pizza
for a same-sex marriage vividly illustrates that many Americans do not believe
the principles and judgments motivating refusals to participate in same-sex
marriages to be “decent and honorable.”  For many, the issue is black and
white: disagreement in this arena constitutes invidious discrimination that
the law should root out, or at least not protect.8  In the case of Memories
Pizza (the O’Connors’ shop), not a single person was denied goods or ser-
vices or suffered any kind of material harm due to the proprietors’ religious
objections to serving pizza for same-sex weddings.  Further, since the situa-
tion arose from a reporter’s hypothetical question rather than a sincere
request from a flesh-and-blood couple, no same-sex couple suffered any dig-
4 Id. Crystal O’Connor elaborated that she supported the proposed Indiana Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act because it would help religious believers avoid complicity in
the wrongdoing of others, adding, “I do not think [the bill is] targeting gays.  I don’t think
it’s discrimination . . . .  It’s supposed to help people that have a religious belief.” Id.
5 Id. (noting that the owners told the reporter that if a gay couple or a couple belong-
ing to another religion came into the restaurant to eat, they would never deny them
service).
6 See Walkerton Pizzeria Once at Center of National Controversy Has Now Closed, SOUTH
BEND TRIB. (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.southbendtribune.com/news/business/
walkerton-pizzeria-once-at-center-of-national-controversy-has-now/article_83b23989-40ef-
554f-b4ab-d4657cf0a150.html; see also Melissa Hudson, High School Coach Suspended After
Tweet About Pizzeria, ABC57 (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.abc57.com/news/high-school-
coach-suspended-after-tweet-about-pizzeria (noting that a coach from a nearby high school
was suspended after tweeting that she felt like driving to Walkerton to burn down the
O’Connors’ pizzeria because she was upset by the fact that the couple did not want to be
associated with same-sex wedding ceremonies).
7 See Walkerton Pizzeria Once at Center of National Controversy Has Now Closed, supra note
6.  It was unclear at the time whether the pizzeria’s closure stemmed from the fallout of the
2015 controversy or whether instead the owners were simply ready to retire. See id.
8 Kevin O’Connor lamented in an interview with the South Bend Tribune that “[o]ut of
anger, there seems to be no getting along anymore . . . .  If your opinion isn’t what some-
body else’s is, then I’m a dirtbag.  Just because I don’t agree with you doesn’t mean I have
to hate you.” See id.
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nitary harm from interacting with pizzeria owners who judged their relation-
ship immoral.  Despite this absence of legally cognizable harms, cultural
pressures led to the temporary closure of a small-town business.
This Note will explore the tension between Justice Kennedy’s words in
Obergefell regarding the decent and honorable premises behind the judgment
of many Americans that same-sex marriage is immoral (or, strictly speaking,
impossible),9 and the treatment afforded to those who attempt to live out
those supposedly decent and honorable beliefs in the public square—bak-
ers,10 florists,11 photographers,12 pizza connoisseurs,13 and more.  It will
assess the relationship between religious liberty, freedom of speech, and
antidiscrimination laws by focusing on issues in the realm of sex and mar-
riage, though complicity claims like the ones explored here arise in various
other contexts, including at the intersection of health care, abortion, and
contraception.14
9 Americans’ views on same-sex marriage have undergone a substantial shift in the
past fifteen years.  The Pew Research Center reports that in 2004 Americans opposed same-
sex marriage by a margin of sixty percent to thirty-one percent, while polling in 2019
revealed that the ratio has flipped, with sixty-one percent of Americans supporting same-
sex marriage and thirty-one percent opposing it. See Attitudes on Same Sex Marriage, PEW
RES. CTR. (May 14, 2019), https://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/changing-attitudes-on-
gay-marriage/.
10 See, e.g., Mark Hemingway, The Neverending War on Jack Phillips, WKLY. STANDARD
(Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.weeklystandard.com/mark-hemingway/masterpiece-
cakeshop-the-neverending-war-on-jack-phillips (explaining that Phillips “has spent the last
six years in and out of courtrooms, defending his right to run his bakery in accordance
with his religion”).  Phillips’s predicament will be discussed in greater detail in Part III of
this Note.
11 See, e.g., Jane C. Timm, Another Gay Wedding Case That Could Go to the Supreme Court.
This One’s About Flowers, NBC NEWS (June 4, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/
politics-news/other-gay-wedding-case-could-go-supreme-court-one-s-n879906 (describing
the litigation that enveloped Barronelle Stutzman, owner of Arlene’s Flowers and Gifts,
after she refused to provide flowers for the wedding of two men in 2013, one of whom was
a longtime customer).
12 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Weighing Free Speech in Refusal to Photograph Lesbian Couple’s
Ceremony, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/19/us/weighing
-free-speech-in-refusal-to-photograph-ceremony.html (describing the experience of Elaine
Huguenin, a photographer, who objected to photographing a same-sex marriage and was
subjected to a discrimination complaint under a New Mexico law forbidding businesses
open to the public to discriminate against gay people).
13 There are differences between the pizza parlor operators’ claim and those of the
baker, florist, and photographer that become relevant when the issue is one of making a
constitutional—as opposed to a merely policy-based—argument for exemption from the
kind of antidiscrimination laws discussed in this Note.  A constitutional argument rooted in
the freedom against compelled speech carries weight for individuals making expressive
products that convey a message, but less weight for a pizzeria, whose product is not expres-
sive in the same way.
14 See TIM BRADLEY, CHARLOTTE LOZIER INST., UNCONSCIONABLE: THREATS TO RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM AND RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE ABORTION DEBATE (2016), https://
s27589.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Conscience-Wars-10.19-1.pdf.
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The Note advances two main arguments for honoring complicity
claims—claims against being made complicit in others’ conduct that one
judges to be immoral or in expressing a message that one judges to be false—
such as those advanced by Jack Phillips, the proprietor of Masterpiece
Cakeshop.  First, the Note argues that those making such complicity claims
have a strong interpretive and conceptual argument that their conduct,
rightly understood and described, falls outside the scope of the relevant
antidiscrimination laws.  Second, even if one disagrees with that argument
and concludes that such cases do come within the ambit of the relevant
antidiscrimination laws, there are strong reasons, rooted in the nature of
religious liberty and the purpose of antidiscrimination law, against applying
those laws to these actors and instead exempting them from their coverage
by amending such laws and providing for such exemptions in future laws.15
Part I will examine the underpinnings of the right to religious freedom
and defend its continued relevance and importance in the American consti-
tutional order.  Part II will discuss the purpose of antidiscrimination law gen-
erally and focus in particular on a type of antidiscrimination law aimed at
protecting gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people from discrimina-
tion: sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) laws.  Part III will
explore two cases concerning conscience-based refusals by bakers to supply
goods for celebrations of same-sex marriages—Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo-
rado Civil Rights Commission16 and Lee v. Ashers Baking Co.17—and argue that
complicity claims in such cases are best understood as not constituting dis-
crimination based on a protected trait.  Such complicity claims are thus
outside the scope of typical SOGI laws.  Part III will conclude by applying the
insights gleaned from the first two Parts by underscoring the importance of
enacting additional protections into law to reinforce the protections pro-
vided by the First Amendment and Religious Freedom Restoration Act so
that those who object to being made complicit in the celebration of same-sex
marriages are not pressured to do so as a condition of remaining in business.
The great task and challenge of our political order, Michael McConnell
writes, “is to distinguish between the freedom that must be left to human
15 This Note will not address in any great detail the merits of the constitutional
defenses—based on free exercise of religion and freedom of speech—at play in these cases
but will instead focus on the underlying rationales for such freedoms and explore how
those rationales can inform the shaping of a statutory scheme addressing these issues.  This
is not because those defenses are unimportant.  Indeed, in the case of an antidiscrimina-
tion law explicitly defining complicity claims such as those discussed in this Note to be
within the bounds of its proscribed “discrimination,” and one in which the policy argu-
ments for exemptions outlined in this Note go unheeded, an individual raising a complic-
ity claim is left to these constitutional defenses.  This Note also does not engage in analysis
of the original meaning of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the rela-
tionship between it and freedom of conscience, though it does treat freedom of conscience
as an important value to consider when crafting laws to govern this area.
16 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
17 Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. [2018] UKSC 49, [12] (appeal taken from N. Ir.), https://
www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2017-0020-judgment.pdf.
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beings if they are to exercise the virtue of freely choosing the right, and the
elements of justice that must ultimately be enforced and compelled by gov-
ernment.”18  Determining which side of that line complicity claims fall on—
whether the state must honor them so that men retain freedom to choose the
right, or whether justice requires that the state punish these conscience-
based refusals to facilitate activities protected by law—is an important and
timely task.
I. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: OUR FIRST FREEDOM
Before relegating complicity claims rooted in religious and moral ideas
to second-class status relative to claims under SOGI laws, we ought to at least
be clear on why religious liberty mattered so much to those who shaped our
constitutional order and why the goods protected by religious liberty are wor-
thy of continued and even special protection.
This Part proceeds by first situating religious liberty in our broader polit-
ical history before discussing the individual interests protected by it and some
of the social benefits that flow from prizing it.  Those incidental benefits
include the capacity of respect for religious liberty to unsettle political victo-
ries, lead to cultural and legal change, and cause one to scrupulously reexam-
ine one’s own views due to opposing arguments from others.  While one
prong of the argument in this Note aims to establish that complicity claims
do not fall within the scope of SOGI laws, in which case there is no need for
religious exemptions for those raising the claims, the discussion in this Part
provides relevant reasons why such claimants ought to be granted exemptions
from such laws if the laws, absent explicit exemptions, are instead read to
cover their conduct.
A. Situating Religious Liberty
Religious liberty is often referred to as our first freedom.19  While its
appearance first in the Bill of Rights is historically only an accident,20 there is
nevertheless a strong argument that religious liberty has a sort of priority
among our sundry freedoms.21  James Madison argued in his Memorial and
18 Michael W. McConnell, Why Is Religious Liberty the “First Freedom”?, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1243, 1252 (2000).
19 See, e.g., Rick Warren, Opinion, Religious Liberty Is America’s First Freedom, WASH. POST
(Mar. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/religious-liberty-is-americas-
first-freedom/2014/03/21/498c0048-b128-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html?utm_
term=.f1f55b00db62 (noting that religious liberty is our first freedom because “if you don’t
have the freedom to live and practice what you believe, the other freedoms are
irrelevant”).
20 Our First Amendment was the third in the list of proposed amendments submitted
for consideration during the First Congress. See McConnell, supra note 18, at 1243.  The
first two were not adopted with the Bill of Rights, but the second later became the Twenty-
Seventh Amendment. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUC-
TION 8–9, 16–17 (1998).
21 McConnell, supra note 18, at 1244.
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Remonstrance that “[i]t is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such
homage, and such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him.  This duty is
precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Soci-
ety.”22  Religious liberty is grounded not so much in personal autonomy but
in the duty of man to live in harmony with whatever greater-than-human
source of meaning and order exists in the universe.23  Madison’s grounding
of religious freedom in the duty of each man to worship the Creator as he
sees fit is not dissimilar to the argument put forward in Dignitatis Humanae,
the Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom.24  There
the fathers of the Council explain that it accords with the dignity of man as a
being endowed with reason and free will that he “should be at once impelled
by nature and also bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially
religious truth,” and that men are “bound to adhere to the truth, once it is
known, and to order their whole lives in accord with the demands of truth.”25
For men to discharge these obligations they must “enjoy immunity from
external coercion as well as psychological freedom,” and this right to relig-
ious freedom protects even those who are deficient in pursuing the truth or
who do not realize the fullness of truth, “provided that just public order be
observed.”26  This proviso that just public order be preserved is important
and reminds us both that there are limits to the scope of the right to religious
liberty and that protection of the political common good can sometimes
require the state to decline to honor a religious liberty claim.27  The free-
22 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184–85 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1901)).
23 An example of the conception of personal autonomy driving much of modern con-
stitutional rights-making is Justice Kennedy’s famous “mystery of life” passage: “At the heart
of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe,
and of the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the attrib-
utes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”  Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  This understanding of liberty is
focused on personal autonomy divorced from any concept of duty stemming from man’s
obligation to seek the truth and is thus deficient as a ground for justifying rights like the
freedom of religion.
24 See SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE [DECLARATION ON
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM] para. 2 (1965) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HUMANAE], http://www.vati
can.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_digni
tatis-humanae_en.html.  For a worthwhile recent survey of the origins of religious liberty,
see ROBERT LOUIS WILKEN, LIBERTY IN THE THINGS OF GOD: THE CHRISTIAN ORIGINS OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2019).  Wilken’s historical work challenges the conventional view that
religious liberty is a product of the Enlightenment and indicates that the origins of relig-
ious liberty are “not political but religious.” Id. at 2.  Wilkens shows “how Christian think-
ers came to consider religious freedom, or liberty of conscience, a natural right that
belongs to all human beings, not an accommodation granted by ruling authorities.” Id. at
5.
25 DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 24, para. 2.
26 Id.
27 According to Dignitatis Humanae, the degree to which the right to religious liberty
will be protected in a given society at a given time can vary depending on empirical facts,
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doms of religion and conscience are intrinsically valuable and socially benefi-
cial.  These benefits will be addressed in turn.
B. Intrinsic Benefits
As both James Madison and the fathers of the Second Vatican Council
affirmed, civil liberties of conscience and religion protect one’s ability—and
duty—to fulfill one’s moral and religious duties in the way one deems best.
Absence of coercion in matters of conscience and religion protects one’s
integrity by fostering harmony between one’s convictions and actions and
between one’s self and the transcendent.  This integrity is good in itself, but
the harmony signified by it is authentic only if freely chosen.  Harmony
between one’s actions and one’s convictions is good in itself even if one’s
convictions about right and wrong are misguided and even if moral duty
compels one to reestablish harmony rooted in different (more upright) con-
victions.  This good gives rise to rights of conscience (because practical rea-
son, grasping this good, directs one to pursue it and instills in one a duty to
do so).  Relatedly, the good of harmony between one’s self and the transcen-
dent is central to what religion is.  Because such harmony is only possible on
a free and willing basis—in other words, because religion is a reflexive
good—it follows that freedom of religion is inescapably built into any sound
understanding of what religion is.  Religious freedom is a natural right, even
for those who ultimately do not establish harmony, let alone upright har-
mony, with that source of transcendence.  These forms of personal integrity
are real dimensions of human well-being, and as such, the good of one’s
integrity “gives the rest of us some reason to respect and promote it.”28
such as the degree to which religious faith that is not the true faith predominates and the
extent to which such religious faith deviates in its moral code from the requirements of just
public order.  So, in a society housing a prominent number of people who are religiously
motivated toward human sacrifice, the right to religious liberty will be correspondingly
narrowed as the state rightly prohibits the practice of human sacrifice because it is
immoral.  Note here, though, that it is not quite right to say that man’s right to religious
liberty is in such a circumstance justifiably infringed by the state because the public good
requires infringement of the right.  Such balancing of individual rights claims against the
requirements of the public good—as if the two were in opposition—misunderstands the
nature of rights.  The misunderstanding stems in part from the modern tendency in rights
talk to speak of rights as two-term realities—X has a right to A—rather than the three-term
realities that they are—X has a claim of right to A that Y has a duty to respect.  Once fully
specified as a three-term relationship, the right is not defeasible. See generally GRÉGOIRE
WEBBER ET AL., LEGISLATED RIGHTS: SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH LEGISLATION 10–14
(2018).  Thus, when the state prohibits human sacrifice despite the religious liberty claim
of some members of the society that their religion requires or permits the practice, the
state is not, properly speaking, infringing anyone’s rights.  Rather, the right to religious
liberty does not extend to cover the claim of the human sacrifice practitioners.  The right,
here, is not defeasible; there simply is no fully specified, three-term relationship entailing
that a person has a right to slaughter another innocent person, claims to the contrary
notwithstanding.
28 Ryan T. Anderson & Sherif Girgis, Against the New Puritanism: Empowering All, Encum-
bering None, in JOHN CORVINO ET AL., DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND DISCRIMINATION 108,
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Ryan Anderson and Sherif Girgis explain that political morality requires
“concern and respect” for these goods and all other basic—that is, inher-
ently, intelligibly motivating—human goods, such that “trampling some basic
goods on our way to others” by intending harm to someone’s most basic
interests as a means to other benefits is ruled out.29  The state ought to allow
each of us to pursue basic goods adequately and fairly “without imposing
onerous and gratuitous burdens on some,” and its goal should be to
“empower without encumbering.”30  But the state protects our ability to pur-
sue basic goods adequately in different ways.  For example, the civil liberty
ensuring freedom of speech is a mere means to the end of pursuing basic
goods.  Speech does not as such have inherent value, but the ability to com-
municate freely is necessary for our pursuit of a number of important
goods—friendship and knowledge, to name just two.31  But rights of con-
science and religious liberty (such as the protections offered to religion in
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution)32 provide direct protection
for basic goods themselves and not just means to their pursuit.
Why should these goods—those of conscience and religious integrity—
receive special protection?  The instrumental benefits of protecting these
goods will be discussed in greater detail below.33  More centrally, though,
these goods are basic aspects of human flourishing, and respecting them
requires respecting people’s freedom to pursue them by their best lights.
Further, these goods are particularly fragile.  As Anderson and Girgis note,
“when it comes to moral and religious integrity—obeying your conscience
and adhering to God as you understand God—you need to avail yourself of
particular options to avoid becoming deficient.”34  Having a wide range of
options is not enough to pursue these goods adequately.  Unlike the good of
friendship, for example, where a policy making it harder to travel to see a
certain friend would not necessarily force you into deficiency with respect to
the good of friendship so long as you had adequate options for pursuing
other relationships, when it comes to religion and conscience, a policy forc-
ing you to violate an aspect of your faith or moral system would force you
into deficiency with respect to that good.35  The fragility of these goods mer-
126 (2017).  Again, that the good of personal integrity gives us some reason to respect and
promote it—both as it is instantiated in our own lives and the lives of others—does not
entail that our reasonable choices in pursuit of other goods (or other instantiations of the
same good) will not sometimes include as a side effect some harm to individuals’ personal
integrity.  But in those instances we do not or ought not intend to harm the good of per-
sonal integrity, which in itself gives us only reasons to respect and promote it.
29 Id. at 127.
30 Id. at 128.
31 See id.
32 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
33 See infra Section I.C.
34 Anderson & Girgis, supra note 28, at 135.
35 See id. at 136 (“If the law pressures someone into flouting her Muslim obligations,
she can’t make up for that—and escape deficiency in religion—by fulfilling a Mennonite
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its their special protection, and as such law should clear the way for individu-
als to obey conscience and religion unless doing so would violate some aspect
of the common good or otherwise work injustice.36  This explains why the
presumption in law should be for exemptions for claims of conscience and
religion.
C. Instrumental Benefits
The grounding of religious liberty in one’s duty to seek the truth by
living in harmony with one’s best judgment about the proper relationship
required between mankind and the Creator (or whatever more-than-human
source or principle of order and meaning in the universe is “out there”)
explains why the idea of religious liberty is conducive to the flourishing of
civil society.  Michael McConnell writes that long before liberalism was con-
ceived, “the division between temporal and spiritual authority gave rise to the
most fundamental features of liberal democratic order: the idea of limited
government, the idea of individual conscience and hence of individual
rights, and the idea of a civil society, as apart from government.”37  Madison’s
admonition that religious duty is precedent both in order of time and degree
of obligation makes sense in this context.  The separation of the proper
spheres of jurisdiction of Church and state (an idea rooted in the Gospels
and taught by popes of the early Church)38 “is the most powerful possible
refutation of the notion that the political sphere is omnicompetent—that it
has rightful authority over all of life.”39  The very idea of limited government
and of politics being a partial and not totalizing aspect of the common good
springs from man’s duty to obey higher powers and his corresponding right
to religious liberty.
duty instead.  There are no alternative channels for her to pursue religion in full.  The
same is true if the law pressures her into violating only one religious duty.  She can’t make
up for violating the teaching against eating pork by redoubling her efforts to live out her
separate duty to pray at certain times.  Her religious life still suffers.”).
36 The natural law argument for respecting, and not intending damage to, the goods
of conscience and religion offered in this paragraph echoes in conclusion the words of
Dignitatis Humanae that men must “enjoy immunity from external coercion as well as psy-
chological freedom” in matters of religion “provided that just public order be observed.”
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 24, para. 2.  But we should not, from the fact that both
arguments arrive at similar conclusions, judge or infer that the natural law arguments
offered by scholars such as Anderson and Girgis are actually theological arguments and
rely on divinely revealed authority.
37 McConnell, supra note 18, at 1244.
38 See Matthew 22:21 (Jesus told the crowd to “give back to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and
to God what is God’s.”).  Michael McConnell relates that since the time of Pope Gelasius
(who was pope from 492 to 496 A.D.), “standard legal thinking in western Europe was
based on the theory of Two Kingdoms—the idea that God created two different forms of
authority, two swords that were clearly distinguished: spiritual and temporal, sacred and
secular, church and state.”  Michael W. McConnell, Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L.
REV. 7, 8.
39 McConnell, supra note 18, at 1247.
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Religious liberty can thus be seen as essential to a healthy civil society,
which grows out of the fact that freedoms of conscience and religion “distin-
guish in theory, and . . . protect in practice, private associations from the
state.”40  These private associations—those “little platoon[s]” that mediate
between the individual and the state41—are valuable in themselves because
they serve as vehicles for the expression of individual responsibility and deter-
mination, and together with freedoms of conscience and religion they fence
in the power of the state.42
Complicity claims are a species of the freedoms of conscience and relig-
ion.  That complicity claims are not different in kind from other conscience
claims means that just as courts do not assess the validity of the claimant’s
underlying moral or religious theory in other contexts where religious or
conscientious objectors seek exemptions from generally applicable laws,43 so
too here courts should not seek to put to their own test of truthfulness
whether a claimant is really being made complicit in conduct he objects to.
In other words, whether a baker is right that making cakes for same-sex mar-
riages makes him complicit in an impermissible way with something he
objects to is not the question courts should be answering in such cases;
rather, they should simply assess whether honoring the claim would have
undue costs according to relevant legal tests.
These complicity claims, which are claims against being made complicit
in others’ conduct that one judges to be immoral, are made by both individu-
als and institutions (acting as legal persons) and can impose costs on third
parties.44  For example, a complicity claim and subsequent refusal to provide
a specific service by a baker for a same-sex wedding ceremony might impose
some material cost on the same-sex couple insofar as they do not get the cake
they want from the baker they have chosen—they must go elsewhere for their
material needs to be met.  Further, as the number of such complicity claims
grows, they might impose another material cost by shaping policies and
40 Sherif Girgis, Nervous Victors, Illiberal Measures: A Response to Douglas NeJaime and Reva
Siegel, 125 YALE L.J.F. 399, 407 (2016).
41 See EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 47 (L.G. Mitchell
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1790).
42 See Girgis, supra note 40, at 409.
43 For example, in considering a pacifist’s claim to a draft exemption courts do not
judge the truth of the underlying moral or religious claim.  The success of the claim for an
exemption does not turn on whether the court judges that the objector is right on the
merits of whether participation in the war is immoral. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380
U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (“The validity of what [the objector] believes cannot be ques-
tioned. . . . [T]hese are inquiries foreclosed to Government.”).
44 See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2566 (2015) (“The impact [of complicity-
based conscience claims] is not only material.  When a religious claim objecting to others’
sinful conduct is based on a traditional norm that is reiterated by a mass movement over
time and across social domains, accommodating the claim has the distinctive power to
stigmatize and demean third parties.”).
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threatening the legal status quo.45  Besides potential material costs, complic-
ity claims can—and often do—send a message to others that they are acting
immorally.  This sort of message is often referred to as a “dignitary harm.”46
The costs potentially imposed by honoring complicity claims can thus be
enumerated to include (1) the material harm of being denied access to
goods or services, (2) the material harm of shaping policies and undermin-
ing political victories, and (3) dignitary harm.  In light of these harms, even if
we grant that respecting complicity claims serves an important good by rein-
forcing the very idea of limited government and setting aside a realm of con-
science and religion into which the power of the state presumptively should
not intrude, one might still ask whether the costs imposed on third parties by
respecting these claims are too great for the state to abstain from
intervention.
This is an important question, but there is a difference between the sec-
ond and third costs noted above and legally cognizable harms (meaning legal
harms serious enough that avoiding them provides the government with a
compelling interest to regulate),47 and these costs only count against bakers
and florists and other raisers of complicity claims at the expense of important
liberal values.48  “[T]hese effects—the ‘material’ harm of shaping policy, and
the ‘dignitary’ harm of expressing moral opposition—are features, not bugs,
of a healthy regime of civil liberties,” Girgis writes.49
The material harm of shaping policy should not count against complicity
claims.  As a species of conscience and religious claims more generally, com-
plicity claims contribute to the development and maintenance of a sphere of
civil society separate from the state and provide a buffer against it.50  To
count the material harm of shaping policy against complicity claims would
signal that in our constitutional republic we respect conscience claims only
when they are relatively insignificant—that the Amish can be granted exemp-
45 See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727
(2018) (noting that if a “long list of persons who provide goods and services for marriages
and weddings might refuse to do so for gay persons,” the resulting “community-wide
stigma” would be “inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure
equal access to goods, services, and public accommodations”).
46 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Sherif Girgis Supporting Petitioners at 2, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
field_document/16-111_tsac_sherif_girgis.pdf (explaining the argument that complicity
claims convey “the idea that same-sex marriage is wrong” and “therefore impose[ ] ‘digni-
tary harm’—the harm of being told (even by polite refusals) that decisions central to your
identity are wrong”).
47 The first type of harm—the material harm of being denied access to goods and
services from a business that has opened itself to the public—is, of course, a legally cogni-
zable harm. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (finding that Con-
gress “had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in restaurants had a direct
and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce” when it enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
48 See Girgis, supra note 40, at 403.
49 Id. at 400 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
50 See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
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tions from laws and have their freedoms of religion and conscience respected
because they are a fairly powerless minority whose witness to conscience is
unlikely to change the cultural status quo, but that Evangelicals or Roman
Catholics are to be coerced because their witness might spur cultural change
on account of their numbers and political coalition-building capabilities.
Such an approach is problematic for at least two reasons.
First, it is inconsistent with the foundations of religious freedom and
draws unprincipled lines.  If the right to religious freedom is grounded in
one’s duty to seek the truth about the divine and live in harmony with that
truth as one best understands it, it should not count against the free exercise
of that right that an individual is part of a politically relevant or powerful
faith group rather than a politically irrelevant fringe group.  The value of
religious liberty is the same, on this understanding, whether one is politically
effective in one’s witness or not.  As such, it would be arbitrary to discount
claims coming from politically effective coalitions but not from politically
irrelevant ones.
Second, because one of the instrumental social benefits of religious lib-
erty is that respecting it creates breathing room for dissenting views and
leaves open the possibility of moral reform, punishing religious claimants for
being politically effective is counterproductive.  After all, respecting such
claims provides an avenue for moral and social reform.  Entrenching political
victories and stifling dissent is a dangerous course for any polity, and humility
alone counsels against doing so.  “As long as civil society’s ideological cur-
rents are allowed to run freely,” Girgis explains, “we all enjoy a steadier flow
of fresh ideas about morality, religion, and politics.”51  Counting such
exemptions’ potential for instigating moral and social reform against them
runs contrary to the roots of such claims and their historical place in the
American political project.
Further, dignitary harm should not count against complicity claims.  In
the first place, both sides in a dispute can claim that a decision against them
will morally stigmatize them.  If a baker is permitted to refuse to provide a
cake for a same-sex wedding ceremony, the same-sex couple is confronted by
the fact that the state is permitting action communicating the message that
someone else finds their conduct immoral.  Conversely, if the baker is forced
to either provide the cake or shutter his wedding cake business, he is sent the
message by the state that his religious or moral convictions are discrimina-
tory, bigoted, and unfit for expression in the public sphere.  Dignitary harm
to one side or the other is inevitable when it comes to morally important and
controversial issues that relate to aspects of life crucial to individuals’ identi-
ties.52  But it is unclear how the state could go about fairly weighing the
51 See Girgis, supra note 40, at 409.
52 It is worth mentioning here that “dignitary harm” is in some ways an inapt label for
the kind of harm being discussed.  Dignity is, and is often thought of as being, intrinsic to
human nature.  Dignity in that sense cannot be harmed by the fact that someone expresses
moral disapproval of one’s conduct.  But in another sense of the word—the sense in which
one’s sense of honor and sense of self are tied to one’s measure of one’s dignity—it makes
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potential dignitary harm to each side in determining which will suffer more
dignitary harm should the other side win.  Second, as Girgis notes, “counting
[dignitary harm] can be self-undermining because fear of it can be self-fulfil-
ling.”53  Social meaning depends on social facts, and the more we say a pol-
icy—say, respecting complicity claims by bakers and florists in the context of
same-sex weddings—ratifies disdain for a group of people because of their
identity rather than their actions, the more such a policy will actually take on
that meaning in the eyes of the public.  This is the case even if no one taking
advantage of the policy to avoid complicity with same-sex weddings intends to
disparage same-sex attracted persons as such.  Thus, whatever dignitary harm
someone like Jack Phillips might be said to impose on potential customers by
raising complicity claims risks being exacerbated by attempts to impute a
social meaning to his actions that inaccurately characterizes his actual choice
and reasoning.  Girgis emphasizes the difference between dignitary harm,
which the law should not take into account, and the pain of being excluded
from public life and markets for goods and services, which the law should
zealously protect against:
There is a vast difference between the humiliation of being denied a seat at
the table of public life and the pain of sitting by people who oppose deci-
sions you prize.  The first, rooted simply in others’ contempt, can and must
be avoided.  The second, stemming from their consciences, is unavoidable in
free societies and conducive to reform.  It is the latter sort of offense that we
should not punish.  We should brook no freestanding right not to be
offended.54
Religious liberty and liberty of conscience offer a safeguard against the
hegemonizing ambitions of the state by imposing limits on government—and
they provide important avenues of moral and social reform.  The fact that
respecting these civil liberties can unsettle political victories, lead to cultural
and legal change, and cause one to scrupulously reexamine one’s own views
due to opposing arguments from others—even if the result is only to confirm
what one previously thought—should not count against protecting them.
These social and incidental benefits are part of the point of these liberties.
Justice Robert Jackson wrote in Barnette that our “[f]reedom to differ is
not limited to things that do not matter much,” as “[t]hat would be a mere
shadow of a freedom.”55  He continued, “The test of [freedom’s] substance is
the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.”56
Jackson earlier argued, in oft-quoted words, that the purpose of the Bill of
Rights “was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials.”57  This
sense to speak of dignitary harms, and so the label will be employed as a useful shorthand
here.
53 See Girgis, supra note 40, at 404.
54 Id. at 413.
55 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 638.
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attitude reflects the attitude of those founders known as the Antifederalists,
whose efforts in raising objections to the proposed Constitution led to the
passage of the Bill of Rights during the First Congress.  The Federalist
defenders of the Constitution argued that a Bill of Rights (including a pro-
tection for freedom of religion) was unnecessary because the whole premise
of the federal government was that it was one of limited, enumerated powers,
and that nowhere in the Constitution was Congress granted the power to
enact laws inhibiting, for example, the free exercise of religion.  The Antifed-
eralists, on the other hand, saw little harm, even if that principle were
granted, in making very sure that sacred liberties like freedom of religion
were not vitiated over time.  One of the pseudonymous Antifederalist writers
argued “that a declaration of those inherent and political rights ought to be
made in a BILL OF RIGHTS, that the people may never lose their liberties by
construction.”58
II. THE PURPOSE OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS
How should we balance the interests served by antidiscrimination laws
against the interests protected by liberties of conscience and religion?  To
determine whether exemptions for complicity claims undermine the purpose
of antidiscrimination laws we must first explore what that purpose is.
The Declaration of Independence affirms that all men are created equal
and endowed with inalienable rights.59  This equality, the Declaration states,
is a self-evident truth.60  Our norms against discrimination are rooted in this
basic equality among and between persons.  “Discrimination” is wrong when
it is arbitrary; that is, when it treats people differently without any sufficiently
justificatory reason.61  But the real picture is more nuanced than popular
lexicon sometimes suggests.  Discrimination in many cases means the same
thing as “choosing and acting in accord with or with reference to particular
criteria.”62  There need be nothing wrong with this kind of discrimination.
For example, some forms of discrimination are morally acceptable and even
necessary, such as discrimination against blind people when hiring truck
drivers.
Problems arise when we discriminate based on criteria that are irrelevant
to the question at hand.  This is what people usually mean when they speak
about discrimination.  Anderson helpfully explains the dichotomy between
invidious and harmless discrimination as one between discriminating and dis-
58 1 HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE For 64 (1981) (emphasis
added) (quoting A Confederationist, Letter to the Editor, PA. HERALD & GEN. ADVERTISER,
Oct. 27, 1787).
59 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
60 Id.
61 See Richard W. Garnett, Religious Freedom and the Nondiscrimination Norm, in LEGAL
RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 194, 196 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012).
62 Id. at 197.
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tinguishing, respectively.63  “We ‘distinguish’ based on relevant factors—as
when we require recipients of driver’s licenses to be able to see.  We ‘discrim-
inate’ based on irrelevant factors—as when many states once required voters
to be white,” Anderson writes.64  There is real danger in applying the morally
charged label of “discrimination” to conduct that merely “distinguishes,” for
there is no reason—no compelling interest—for the state “to ban, regulate,
or disapprove ‘discrimination’ generally, as opposed to discrimination that
has been shown, with reference to factors other than the mere use of criteria,
to be wrong.”65
Further, it is not always the case that the state can or should regulate or
prohibit discrimination even when it is wrongful.66  The state should only
regulate wrongful discrimination when it is within the state’s limited power to
do so, taking into account the difficulty of identifying some forms of discrimi-
nation, the possible impositions on legitimate choices imposed by the blunt
instrument of legal coercion, and other relevant considerations.67  Anderson
argues that “antidiscrimination policies should serve as shields, not swords.”68
Such laws, he continues, “are meant to shield people from unjust discrimina-
tion that might prevent them from flourishing in society, not to punish peo-
ple for acting on reasonable beliefs.”69
When are laws against wrongful discrimination required?  The bar
should be set high, given our presumption in favor of liberty and the general
baseline rule that “the law leaves people free to deal with others on their own
terms, by their own lights.”70  American law recognizes a small number of
63 See Ryan T. Anderson Disagreement Is Not Always Discrimination: On Masterpiece
Cakeshop and the Analogy to Interracial Marriage, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 123, 128 (2018).
64 Id.
65 Garnett, supra note 61, at 197.
66 See id.  For example, discrimination on the basis of eyelash length would be wrong-
ful in most circumstances (it would be acceptable if one were filling a position for a mas-
cara model).  It would be wrongful to discriminate on the basis of eyelash length in most
employment settings because eyelash length is irrelevant to one’s ability to perform good
work.  But just because the discrimination is wrongful does not mean the law should pro-
hibit it.  It might not make sense for the law to do so.  Discrimination on the basis of
eyelash length might not be widespread enough to justify the intervention of the law.  Peo-
ple with short eyelashes might not constitute an identifiable group that needs the law’s
protection to have adequate access to the marketplace for goods and service and work.
And in any event, market forces will tend to drive out of the market those who discriminate
foolishly based on irrelevant factors, because in doing so they will miss out on beneficial
transactions and competitors will reap those benefits.  If nonlegal forces are doing the
work of eliminating wrongful discrimination, it is often unnecessary for the law to get
involved.  The example is drawn from Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommoda-
tions, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Laws, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 640–41 (2015).
67 See id.
68 Anderson, supra note 63, at 127 (emphasis added).
69 Id.
70 Anderson & Girgis, supra note 28, at 175.  At common law, private property owners
who enter the sphere of public accommodation thereby grant the public a license to enter
their property for the purpose of acquiring the goods or services on offer, but “[t]hat
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protected traits upon which refusals to deal cannot legally be based.71
Antidiscrimination laws (which historically have been narrowly drawn) are
exceptions from the general rule.  Andrew Koppelman explains that the “gen-
eral rule that governs business transactions, both public accommodation and
employment, is contract at will.  In most states, most businesses have the priv-
ilege of refusing service to anyone for any reason or no reason.”72  Antidis-
crimination laws alter the status quo by preventing economic actors from
discriminating based on certain protected specific traits, while they remain
free to be as arbitrary as they like in respect of nonprotected traits.73  The
fact that antidiscrimination laws ban private discrimination on just a few
select grounds and only in limited contexts suggests that nonlegal forces
must push back against most forms of wrongful discrimination and that there
are real costs to banning even wrongful discrimination that justify the state’s
reluctance to do so absent serious need.74
To rebut the presumption in favor of liberty reflected in our baseline
rule of free dealing, the need for a ban on a form of wrongful discrimination
license can be refused or terminated for a ‘good reason.’”  Brief of Amicus Curiae Legal
Scholar Adam J. MacLeod in Support of Petitioners at 6, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo.
Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111) (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 571 (1995)), https://
www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/16-111_tsac_adam_j_macleod.pdf.
Thus, at common law a business owner has the right to refuse service, but he or she must
have a valid reason for doing so.  As Adam MacLeod explains, cases raising complicity
claims such as the ones addressed in this Note concern private property that “is held open
for a particular business purpose,” and in such cases “the public’s license to enter and
conduct business is neither terminable at will nor a vested right to be served.  It is a license
carved out of the owner’s estate by the owner’s purpose for opening to the public.” Id. at
6–7.  A reason related to the owner’s purpose for opening his or her property to the public
“will generally suffice to justify the owner in terminating a particular customer’s license,”
unless that reason is singled out by a public accommodations law as a categorically invalid
reason to exclude. Id. at 7–8.  Elsewhere, MacLeod notes that “[w]here the business owner
is religious, those valid purposes for serving and refusing to serve may lawfully include
religious purposes.”  Adam J. MacLeod, Equal Property Rights for All, Including Christian Wed-
ding Cake Bakers, PUB. DISCOURSE (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/
2017/11/20584/.
71 For example, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in places
of public accommodation based on race, color, religion, or national origin.  42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a (2012).  Laws forbidding discrimination based on sex and disability in various con-
texts are also common. See, e.g., id. § 2000e-2 (forbidding discrimination in employment
based on sex); id. § 12101–12213 (prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disa-
bilities in all areas of public life).
72 Koppelman, supra note 66, at 640.
73 See id. (“So long as economic actors do not engage in the enumerated types of
discrimination, they have the privilege of being as arbitrary as they like.  I can, for example,
absolutely refuse to hire or do business with anyone whose eyebrows are not at least three
inches long.”).  Koppelman points out that while the law might decline to prevent discrimi-
nation based on arbitrary characteristics such as eyebrow length, market forces will tend to
drive out of the market those who discriminate based on irrelevant factors. See id. at 641.
74 See Anderson & Girgis, supra note 28, at 177–78.
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must be great, and the cost of enforcement in terms of trampling on legiti-
mate choices must be comparatively minimal.  Anderson and Girgis offer a
framework that balances these considerations: an antidiscrimination law is
warranted when (1) private actors’ treatment of a particular (discrete and
identifiable) group imposes material or social harms, or both, that can best
be cured by the law, and (2) the law is narrowly tailored to successfully stifle
interactions causing those harms without banning too many legitimate inter-
actions along the way or trampling too far on important interests related to
the freedoms of conscience, religion, and speech.75
This framework makes sense of the central purpose of antidiscrimination
law, which is “an intervention that aims at systemic effects in society, disman-
tling longstanding structures of dominance and subordination.”76  Koppel-
man notes that some advocates have misunderstood the legal harm of
discrimination “as a particularized injury to the person, rather than the arti-
fact of social engineering that it really is.”77  Antidiscrimination laws aim at
structural problems reflecting widespread and systematic stigmatization and
unequal treatment of a particular group, rather than isolated instances of
individual harm.  They aim at destabilizing deeply rooted unfair and
debilitating attitudes about individuals’ basic worth and social status.
While antidiscrimination laws serve important and legitimate purposes,
their scope is limited and the bar for justifying them is high.  These laws
reflect our commitment to basic human equality, and they fight the harm
that results from a group’s exclusion from the public square, but they ought
not enforce a right not to be offended.  Moreover, the complicity claims at
issue here do not seriously undermine this purpose of antidiscrimination
laws.  Whereas invidious discrimination is about avoiding contact with groups
of people based on unfair and debilitating ideas about their inferiority, com-
plicity claims are about denying services, regardless of who requests them,
because the service contributes to activities or expresses a message to which
the service provider objects on moral or religious grounds.
As was discussed above,78 some of the harms ascribed to honoring com-
plicity claims are features rather than bugs of fostering a healthy regime of
civil liberties, and even those material harms that should count against com-
plicity claims—the exclusion of some customers from access to goods and
services—have not been shown to be prevalent enough in American society
to establish that those harms can best be cured by law.  When the need for
laws to counteract the complicity claims at issue in this Note are weighed
against the risks that such laws pose to freedoms of conscience, religion, and
speech, the balance favors excluding such claims from the scope of antidis-
crimination laws.
75 See id. at 179.
76 Koppelman, supra note 66, at 639 (emphasis added).
77 Id. at 620.
78 See supra notes 47–54 and discussion in the accompanying text on material and
dignitary harms.
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III. COMPLICITY CLAIMS DO NOT CONSTITUTE INVIDIOUS DISCRIMINATION
AND SHOULD BE PROTECTED IN LAW
The remainder of this Note will argue that complicity claims like the one
offered (hypothetically) by the owners of Memories Pizza in Walkerton, Indi-
ana, do not fall within the scope of SOGI laws, properly understood.  It will
conclude by arguing that, even if one stipulates that such claims do fall within
the scope of such laws, there is a strong case for not banning them.  This Part
will proceed by first analyzing Masterpiece Cakeshop and Ashers Baking Co. and
then addressing statutory protections for complicity claimants.
A. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission
Jack Phillips owns and operates Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Lake-
wood, Colorado.  He is also a Christian.79  In 2012, a same-sex couple visited
Phillips’s bakery to order a cake for their wedding reception.  Phillips told
the couple he could not in good conscience create a cake for their wedding
because he was opposed to same-sex marriage on religious grounds.80  The
couple filed a complaint with the state’s Civil Rights Commission, which
found that Phillips had discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation in
violation of Colorado antidiscrimination law.81  Several years later, the case
reached the Supreme Court, where Phillips argued that the Commission had
violated his freedom of speech by compelling his speech and violated his free
exercise rights by treating him differently because of his religion than secular
bakers who had also refused to create cakes carrying messages they rejected.
The Court ruled in Phillips’s favor on narrow grounds: that the officials
who ordered him to provide cakes for same-sex weddings exhibited imper-
missible hostility toward Phillips’s religious beliefs, violating the neutrality
toward religion required by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.82  The Court has interpreted the First Amendment to not require judi-
cially crafted exemptions from neutral laws of general applicability since it
decided Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith
in 1990.83  But it has nevertheless affirmed that if the government fails to act
neutrally toward the free exercise of religion, it must satisfy strict scrutiny (a
standard the government almost always fails to satisfy).84 Masterpiece followed
in the wake of the Court’s neutrality-protecting precedents.  While the ruling
in Masterpiece was helpful for people like Phillips who hold traditional views
about marriage (not least because it indicates that traditional views on mar-
79 See Jack Phillips, ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM, https://adflegal.org/detailspages/
client-stories-details/jack-phillips (last visited Nov. 11, 2019).
80 See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018).
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1723–24.
83 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990).
84 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993).
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riage are not akin to racism),85 it was nevertheless fact bound and contin-
gent; the majority cautioned that it reached the result it did “whatever the
outcome of some future controversy involving facts similar to these.”86
One important aspect of the issues contained in Masterpiece that could
have a broader effect if addressed squarely by the Court in a future case was
debated in concurrences by Justices Gorsuch and Kagan.  Justice Gorsuch
focused on the impermissible double standard adopted by the Commission.
Phillips refused to make a cake for a same-sex wedding requested by a same-
sex couple (and then by one of the men’s mothers).  Three other bakers
refused to make cakes bearing messages denigrating same-sex marriage
requested by a religious individual.87  Despite both sets of cases’ sharing “all
legally salient features,” Justice Gorsuch wrote, “the Commission failed to act
neutrally by applying a consistent legal rule.”88  The effect in both cases on
the customer was a refusal of service.  But, Justice Gorsuch noted, in both cases
the bakers refused intending only to honor their convictions, that is, to live
with integrity, even if they knew that doing so would have the unfortunate
effect of leaving a customer in a protected class unserved.89  But because all
the bakers involved testified that “they would not sell the requested cakes to
anyone, while they would sell other cakes to members of the protected class
(as well as to anyone else),” Justice Gorsuch was confident that none of the
bakers refused service because of the customers’ identity.90
While the law sometimes recognizes the distinction between intended
and knowingly accepted effects,91 it sometimes conflates intent and knowl-
85 As Sherif Girgis notes, “[i]f Phillips deserved to be treated like a racist . . . the
majority would not have balked at Colorado officials’ dismissiveness towards his religion”
because hostility towards racism is not offensive to constitutionally protected values.  Sherif
Girgis, Filling in the Blank Left in the Masterpiece Ruling: Why Gorsuch and Thomas Are Right,
PUB. DISCOURSE (June 14, 2018), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2018/06/21831/.
86 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
87 See id. at 1735–36 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1735.
90 Id. Of course, whether Justice Gorsuch is correct here depends in part on what the
“requested cake” was.  Symbols (and referential statements) are critically context depen-
dent for their meaning.  A cake that is identical in terms of icing, design, and even text can
carry different meanings depending on context.  To borrow an example from Sherif
Girgis, a cake bearing the text “Banks are a Blessing from the Lord” will mean something
different at a convention of investment bankers than it will at a convention of fishermen.
Sherif Girgis, The Christian Baker’s Unanswered Legal Argument: Why the Strongest Objections
Fail, PUB. DISCOURSE (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2017/11/
20581/.
91 An example of the distinction between intention and foresight (even of effects that
seem certain to occur on account of my actions) is that of jogging: when I go jogging, my
intention is to be fit and to get healthier; I know with certainty that an effect of my going
jogging will be the wearing out of the soles on my shoes, but I do not intend that wearing
out as either a means or an end.  If I went jogging and found the soles of my shoes resistant
to wearing out, I would be glad and would not consider my purpose in jogging to have
been thwarted in any way.
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edge or presumes intent from a showing of knowledge.92  But the law should
not recognize that distinction with respect to one case and ignore it with
respect to another, similar case.  Like cases should be treated alike.  In Mas-
terpiece, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission distinguished between
intended and knowingly accepted effects when it came to the secular bakers’
refusing to make cakes denigrating same-sex marriage, but did not do so in
Phillips’s case, finding instead that intent to disfavor a protected class should
be presumed from a knowing failure to serve someone belonging to that
class.93  This double standard gets at the heart of a crucial point: either both
sets of bakers were discriminating based on a protected trait, or neither was.
As Justice Gorsuch explained:
If Mr. Phillips’s objection is “inextricably tied” to a protected class, then the
bakers’ objection in [the Christian patron’s] case must be “inextricably tied”
to one as well.  For just as cakes celebrating same-sex weddings are (usually)
requested by persons of a particular sexual orientation, so too are cakes
expressing religious opposition to same-sex weddings (usually) requested by
persons of particular religious faiths.  In both cases the bakers’ objection
would (usually) result in turning down customers who bear a protected
characteristic.94
The Commission “cannot slide up and down the mens rea scale, picking a
mental state standard to suit its tastes depending on its sympathies,” Gorsuch
went on to note.95  Whatever the Commission does, it must be consistent and
treat like cases alike.
Justice Kagan agreed with Justice Gorsuch on the basic point that bakers
(and other providers of creative goods) can choose what to make, but not for
whom to make it—they must treat customers the same regardless of traits
protected by antidiscrimination law.96  But Justice Kagan believed the Colo-
rado Civil Rights Commission was correct to treat the secular bakers differ-
ently than it treated Phillips because she has a different understanding of
92 Masterpiece, 138 S. Ct. at 1736 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Other times, of course,
the law proceeds differently, either conflating intent and knowledge or presuming intent
as a matter of law from a showing of knowledge.”).
93 See id. Of course, the Commission would not hold that in all circumstances in which
one knowingly denies someone in a protected class, one must be discriminating against
them because of their protected trait.  For example, imagine one lives in a jurisdiction rec-
ognizing sexual orientation as a protected trait for employment purposes.  If one fires an
employee whom one knows to be same-sex attracted because that employee missed more
days of work than the company’s policy permits, one is not firing that employee because he
is same-sex attracted even though one knows that the employee possesses that protected
trait, so one would not be liable for violating the employment law.  Here, the Commission’s
conflation of intent and knowledge was based on its determination that sexual orientation
and one’s choice in marriage are so bound up together that they cannot be meaningfully
distinguished.  Thanks to Sherif Girgis for discussion on this point and for providing the
example.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1737.
96 See id. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring) (“A vendor can choose the product he
sells, but not the customers he serves—no matter the reason.”).
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what the relevant “product” is in such cases.  Justice Kagan argued that the
relevant product in the case of Phillips is simply a wedding cake (with no
words or explicit message)—one “suitable for use at same-sex and opposite-
sex weddings alike.”97  Kagan explained, “Phillips sells wedding cakes.  As to
that product, he unlawfully discriminates: He sells it to opposite-sex but not
to same-sex couples.”98 In the case of the other bakers, Kagan argued, the
product was a cake with words disparaging same-sex marriage.  It makes sense
by her lights to treat the two sets of bakers differently.
Justice Gorsuch disagreed.  Not mincing words, he countered that “[t]o
suggest that cakes with words convey a message but cakes without words do
not—all in order to excuse the bakers in [the Christian patron’s] case while
penalizing Mr. Phillips—is irrational.”99  Justice Gorsuch does not think any-
one can reasonably doubt that a wedding cake without words nevertheless
conveys a message.  “Words or not and whatever the exact design, [the cake]
celebrates a wedding, and if the wedding cake is made for a same-sex couple
it celebrates a same-sex wedding.”100  The Commission (or the Supreme
Court rationalizing after the fact) cannot play with the level of generality at
which the “product” is to be defined (using a very general definition in one
case and speaking of “wedding cakes” writ large, and sliding down to a more
specific level of generality and speaking of “wedding cakes denigrating same-
sex marriage” in another) to justify outcomes treating like cases differently.
It is true, of course, as Justice Gorsuch acknowledged, that under Smith a
vendor cannot escape the clutches of an antidiscrimination law just because
his religious beliefs run contrary to the demands of the law, but such laws
must nevertheless be applied in a manner that treats religious beliefs with
neutral respect.101  So the government must apply the same level of general-
ity across cases.
The Court’s free speech jurisprudence supports Justice Gorsuch’s argu-
ment and clarifies the debate.  In Spence v. Washington, the Court explained
that “the context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is
important, for the context may give meaning to the symbol.”102  Free speech
is woven into the religious liberty issues raised by those who sell or provide
expressive products.103  Free speech law affirms that an expressive item’s con-
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 1738 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 1739.
102 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (per curiam).  The Court in Spence
cites Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), another free speech case, for
support of its point.
103 The fact that context gives meaning to symbols is important in delimiting the extent
to which complicity claims should be honored on compelled speech grounds.  For exam-
ple, it is expressive activity for Jack Phillips to create a cake for a wedding ceremony, but it
would not be expressive activity for him to sell a generic off-the-shelf (already prepared)
cake to a customer who then serves the cake at a same-sex wedding.  The context in that
circumstance would not suggest that Phillips created expression celebrating a same-sex
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text shapes its meaning, and this insight supports Justice Gorsuch’s argument
about impermissible double standards.104  Given that most states will not be
willing to coerce economic actors who object to creating expressions deni-
grating same-sex attracted persons or same-sex marriage, those states will also
be unable to coerce people like Phillips, so long as the Court adopts the
insights of its free speech cases and applies them to complicity claims in
future cases involving expressive products.105
A recent example of the application of free speech doctrine to complic-
ity claims involving expressive products constituting artistic speech is the
Eighth Circuit’s 2019 decision in Telescope Media Group v. Lucero.106  There,
the Eighth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to a Minnesota statute that prohib-
ited discrimination because of sexual orientation in public accommoda-
tions.107  The court reversed dismissal of a wedding videographer’s claim for
preenforcement injunctive relief from the statute, which the state read to
require the videographer to produce both opposite-sex and same-sex wed-
ding videos, on grounds that the statute impermissibly compelled speech.108
“[R]egulating speech because it is discriminatory or offensive is not a com-
pelling state interest, however hurtful the speech may be,” the court
noted.109
wedding.  If a same-sex couple entered a Dairy Queen and bought a generic ice cream cake
at the counter and served it at their fifth wedding anniversary party that weekend, Dairy
Queen would not thereby have created an expressive item carrying a pro-same-sex mar-
riage message.  The importance of context is not of relevance to delimiting the extent to
which complicity claims should be honored on statutory religious freedom grounds under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), however.  For RFRA purposes, what mat-
ters is that the individual has a sincere religious objection to selling the product.
104 Thomas Berg argues that this is “potentially a powerful principle.”  Thomas C. Berg,
Masterpiece Cakeshop: A Romer for Religious Objectors?, 2017–2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 139,
152 (“Left-leaning states and cities will be unwilling to force socially liberal vendors to
produce goods with conservative religious messages in violation of their consciences.
Those states cannot then turn around and require religiously conservative vendors to pro-
duce goods in violation of their consciences.  Religious objectors facing litigation can send
testers to smoke out such uneven enforcement of anti-discrimination law.”).
105 See Girgis, supra note 85.  For an analysis of the overlaying of the free speech argu-
ment on top of the religious liberty argument at stake in Masterpiece, see Scott W. Gaylord,
Is a Cake Worth a Thousand Words? Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Impact of Antidiscrimination
Laws on the Marketplace of Ideas, 85 TENN. L. REV. 361, 362 (2018) (asking what happens
when a state attempts to require either individuals or for-profit businesses to “design and
create expressive works that foster or promote a message with which the business and its
owners disagree” and explaining that at that point “antidiscrimination laws collide with the
Supreme Court’s laissez-faire approach to the marketplace of ideas, which eschews virtually
all governmental regulation of free speech”).
106 936 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2019).
107 Id. at 748, 754.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 755.
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B. Lee v. Ashers Baking Co.
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom decided a case similar to
Masterpiece on October 10, 2018.110  In 2014, Ashers Baking Co., located in
Northern Ireland, refused to fill an order from a same-sex-attracted man for
a cake bearing the message “Support Gay Marriage” and bearing the images
of the familiar Sesame Street characters Bert and Ernie.111  The customer
planned to bring the cake to a meeting of same-sex marriage supporters in
Northern Ireland, which does not grant legal status to such unions.112  The
owners of the bakery are Christians and object to same-sex marriage on relig-
ious grounds.113  After a Belfast court initially held that the bakery had dis-
criminated on the basis of sexual orientation and fined the owners of the
bakery, and the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s
decision, the UK Supreme Court in October sided with the bakery and over-
turned the finding of invidious discrimination.114
The UK Supreme Court’s analysis helpfully illuminates the relationship
between discrimination and complicity claims that is at play, but is not
decided, in Masterpiece—and the UK court’s reasoning, while not applicable
in the United States as legal precedent, could have persuasive force as a mat-
ter of reason.  The fundamental basis for the UK court’s decision to protect
the bakery’s refusal to provide the cake supporting same-sex marriage was
that “there was no discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation.”115  The
bakery would have supplied the same customer (who was gay) with a cake
that lacked the message supporting gay marriage, and it would have refused
to supply to a heterosexual customer the cake that was requested in this case.
The bakery’s objection was to the message, not the messenger.116  The cus-
tomer’s sexual orientation was not relevant to the deliberation of the bakery
and its ultimate decision to refuse the cake order at all.117
The court considered not only whether the bakery directly discriminated
based on sexual orientation—concluding that it did not—but also whether
the criterion used by the bakery to refuse the order was “indissociable” from
the protected characteristic of sexual orientation and thus a proxy for direct
discrimination based on a protected trait.118  The court argued that “there is
110 Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. [2018] UKSC 49 (appeal taken from N. Ir.), https://
www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2017-0020-judgment.pdf.
111 Ed O’Loughlin, Belfast Bakery Was Free to Refuse Gay-Marriage Cake, Court Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/10/world/europe/northern-
ireland-cake-gay.html.
112 See id. Nor did the state of Colorado recognize same-sex unions as marriages in law




115 Ashers, [2018] UKSC at [62].
116 See id. at [11].
117 See id. at [23].
118 See id. at [25] (noting that the lower court concluded that support for same-sex
marriage was indissociable from sexual orientation).
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no such [indissociable] identity between the criterion and sexual orientation
of the customer.”119  It explained, “People of all sexual orientations, gay,
straight or bi-sexual, can and do support gay marriage.  Support for gay mar-
riage is not a proxy for any particular sexual orientation.”120  The owners of
Ashers Bakery regard same-sex marriage as contrary to their religious beliefs,
and the fact that the customer was gay was irrelevant to their decision to
adhere to their religious beliefs and refuse the order.121
The court was not dismissive of the problem of discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation.122  But, the court explained, discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation “is not what happened in this case and it does
the project of equal treatment no favours to seek to extend it beyond its proper scope.”123
The UK Supreme Court mentioned Masterpiece in a postscript to its opin-
ion, noting—not entirely persuasively—that “[t]he facts are not the same”
and that there might be relevant differences between the two cases relating
to the messages the requested cakes sent (the cake in Ashers featured words
and an image whereas the cake requested of Phillips was wordless, for exam-
ple).124  But the court emphasized that “there is a clear distinction between
refusing to produce a cake conveying a particular message, for any customer
who wants such a cake, and refusing to produce a cake for the particular
customer who wants it because of that customer’s characteristics.”125  Each
case that arises can be judged individually, the court suggested, but the situa-
tion in Ashers was clear: the bakery would have refused to bake the cake
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 But see Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemp-
tions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1170
(2012) (arguing that those who conclude that complicity claims need not entail discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation are mistaken because “same-sex relationships are
an expression of identity” and “religious objections largely relate to that identity” in such a
way that “impermissible discrimination based on sexual orientation includes discrimina-
tion against same-sex relationships”).  NeJaime thus collapses identity and conduct and
holds that one cannot object to someone’s conduct without thereby objecting to who they are
in terms of identity.  But this obscures a common and proper distinction that we make all
the time in disapproving of particular actions without condemning a person’s very identity
or demeaning their human dignity.  NeJaime’s argument has unwelcome implications: by
his logic, a state that punishes religiously motivated, complicity-based refusals to provide
products for same-sex wedding ceremonies is thereby punishing religious identity because
the conduct of refusing to serve is an expression of the individual’s identity, and discriminat-
ing on the basis of religion is generally prohibited.
122 See Ashers, [2018] UKSC at [35] (“It is deeply humiliating, and an affront to human
dignity, to deny someone a service because of that person’s race, gender, disability, sexual
orientation or any of the other protected personal characteristics.”).
123 Id. (emphasis added).
124 Id. at [59].
125 Id. at [62].
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requested for any customer, so there was no discrimination based on grounds
of sexual orientation.126
C. Complicity Claims Fall Outside the Scope of SOGI Laws
The analyses provided in Masterpiece and Ashers, addressing the intersec-
tion of legal doctrines governing freedom of religion, freedom of speech,
and antidiscrimination, paint a telling portrait of the landscape surrounding
complicity claims.
The discussion between Justices Gorsuch and Kagan in Masterpiece illus-
trates the importance of accurately describing the actions of those bringing
complicity claims and attentiveness to their reasons for action.  A proper anal-
ysis of Jack Phillips’s complicity claim reveals that sexual orientation does not
have explanatory power for why he refused to create a cake for a same-sex
wedding.  His objection to same-sex marriage, on the other hand, does have
explanatory power.
The UK Supreme Court’s opinion in Ashers recognized that the fact that
Ashers Baking Co.’s customer was gay was irrelevant to their decision to
adhere to their religious beliefs and refuse the order for the cake expressing
a message of support for same-sex marriage.  In arguing that the bakery’s
refusal to create a cake expressing support for same-sex marriage was not
indissociably linked to discrimination based on sexual orientation, the Court
recognized that discrimination based on sexual orientation and discrimina-
tion based on an objection to same-sex marriage are analytically distinct con-
cepts. Ashers is of no precedential value in the United States, and the UK
Supreme Court went out of its way to distinguish it from Masterpiece, but for
the limited point that discrimination based on sexual orientation and disa-
greement about the nature of marriage are analytically distinguishable,
Ashers provides helpful analysis and an example of a court of law recognizing
a distinction that is often elided.
Parties on all sides of the issue agree that complicity claims can impose
costs on third parties—namely, the material cost of being denied a good or
service.  But many parties also agree that the material costs imposed by com-
plicity claims are quite low in current circumstances, and that persons are not
being excluded from markets for goods or services because of them.  Andrew
Koppelman notes:
Hardly any of these cases [of complicity claims] have occurred: a handful in
a country of 300 million people.  In all of them, the people who objected to
the law were asked directly to facilitate same-sex relationships, by providing
wedding, adoption, or artificial insemination services, counseling, or rental
of bedrooms. There have been no claims of a right to simply refuse to deal with gay
126 Id. This argument is familiar to that offered by Justice Gorsuch in his Masterpiece
concurrence—namely, that Jack Phillips would not bake the requested cake (specifically, a
cake celebrating a same-sex marriage) for any customer, regardless of sexual orientation,
and thus was not discriminating on the grounds of sexual orientation. See Masterpiece
Cakeshop v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1735–36 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
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people.  Even in the large number of states with no antidiscrimination protec-
tion for gay people, I am unaware of any case where a couple was unable to
conduct a wedding.127
Further, Koppelman acknowledges that “the dignitary harm of knowing
that some of your fellow citizens condemn your way of life is not one from
which the law can or should protect you in a regime of free speech.”128
It might be the case that the need for SOGI laws is not great under
current circumstances, given that the costs they impose on religious liberty
and freedom of speech can be considerable.  But that question is not decided
here.  The discussion in this Note is aimed at making two, more limited
points, both of which have purchase in settings in which SOGI laws are
enacted.
The first point is that situations like Phillips’s refusal to create a custom
wedding cake celebrating a same-sex marriage should not be read to be
within the scope of those laws,129 since those refusals are not discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation.  The text of Minnesota’s Human Rights
Act, at issue in the Eight Circuit’s opinion in Telescope Media Group, is typical
of the language of SOGI laws: “It is an unfair discriminatory practice . . . to
deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facili-
ties, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accom-
modation because of . . . sexual orientation . . . .”130  Discrimination because
of sexual orientation entails taking sexual orientation into account in one’s
decisionmaking, such that the sexual orientation of the person one is dealing
with has explanatory power of one’s decision to refuse service.  In cases like
Masterpiece and Ashers Baking Co., where the proprietor has indicated and
established a willingness to serve all customers regardless of sexual orienta-
tion but has refused to provide services conveying messages of approval of
same-sex marriage, sexual orientation does not have explanatory power.
“Discrimination based on opposition to same-sex marriage” is analytically dis-
tinct from “discrimination based on sexual orientation.”  Thus, a law prohib-
iting the latter does not necessarily also serve to prohibit the former absent
an explicit definition of the discrimination aimed at by the law that includes
conduct that is best described as stemming from disagreement about the
nature of marriage.  One might still conclude that complicity claims
grounded in opposition to same-sex marriage still ought not be honored, but
greater attentiveness to the exact nature of such claims—what grounds they
rest on and what grounds they do not rest on—at least serves to clarify the
127 Andrew Koppelman, A Zombie in the Supreme Court: The Elane Photography Cert
Denial, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 77, 91–92 (2015) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
128 Koppelman, supra note 66, at 628.
129 Some SOGI laws contain exemptions for religious actors, but these are quite lim-
ited. See Ryan Anderson, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) Laws Are Not Fairness
for All, HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/gender/report/sex
ual-orientation-and-gender-identity-sogi-laws-are-not-fairness-all?fbclid=IWAR2tAShV9LTb2
jESvW-DB0bzButXbfYpaw-SR3i4ufkmwsNrSPXUynbgmXU.
130 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.11, subdiv. 1(a)(1) (West 2019).
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public conversation.  Accurately characterizing complicity claims underscores
that in many cases what is at issue is a disagreement about the nature of
marriage rather than any sort of animus or bigotry toward same-sex-attracted
persons as such.  Reasonable disagreement about the nature of marriage is
not the same thing as discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  If
legislators enacting SOGI laws desire those laws to cover conduct such as Jack
Phillips’s, the statutory language of SOGI laws should say so explicitly.
The second point is that even if one grants that such refusals do fall
under the definition of “discrimination because of sexual orientation,”131
there are strong policy reasons for not banning them and for including
exemptions for such conduct in SOGI laws themselves.  These reasons are
rooted in the value of religious liberty as discussed in Part I and in the pur-
pose of antidiscrimination law as discussed in Part II.  Because states and
localities can interpret the text of their SOGI laws more broadly than a plain
reading suggests, independent statutory protections for people like Phillips
are warranted to provide explicit protection for the goods of religion and
conscience in these situations.132
131 The basic argument against this Note’s conceptual and interpretive argument is a
“purposivist” one that would read SOGI laws in their context and judge that the purpose
served by such laws is to ensure equal access to the marketplace for same-sex-attracted
persons, which purpose is thwarted by allowing places of public accommodation to dis-
criminate against conduct (same-sex marriage) or messages (celebration of this particular
marriage) that are closely related to the identity of same-sex-attracted persons.  Against this
argument, one might note that antidiscrimination laws do not always define precisely what
constitutes discrimination based on a protected trait, and the reasoning above might there-
fore help to inform policy debate about and limit the interpretive boundaries of broad
statutory language.
132 One might ask why statutory protections are warranted if the rights to religious
liberty and freedom of speech are already enshrined in the Constitution itself.  One could
have asked the same question in response to the passage of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act.  That legislation responded most directly to a Supreme Court decision that many
legislators disagreed with. See Brian Miller, The Age of RFRA, FORBES (Nov. 16, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/briankmiller/2018/11/16/the-age-of-rfra/#41c2996d77ba.
Thus, one reason to enact legislation to provide protection to interests already protected in
the Constitution is to respond—retroactively or preemptively—to adverse rulings by courts
disparaging those rights.  Another reason to do so is in response to the passage of laws by
states or ordinances by localities that could come into conflict with constitutional rights.
Another is to further specify the general and unspecified rights enshrined in the Constitu-
tion to give them fuller meaning in specific circumstances.  Statutory protections are war-
ranted here because available constitutional defenses may prove to be uncertain harbors
for complicity claimants.  Free speech claims may only be availing for a select subset of
these cases—those involving expressive products constituting a form of artistic speech
whose regulation is subject to strict scrutiny.  Free exercise claims in this area do not
appear to fit neatly into the Court’s reigning jurisprudence in this area.  See infra note 143
for a discussion of these issues in the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Telescope Media Group.
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D. Opponents of Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Protected Like
Pro-Life Citizens Have Been
Some statutes provide categorical protections for certain moral convic-
tions because coercion is not needed (or justified) to ensure the public inter-
est is met.  This is what the United States has done with respect to abortion.
Just months after the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade in 1973, Congress
passed the Church Amendment, legislation that protects abortion-related
conscience rights of both individuals and institutions.133 Roe protected
women’s right to procure abortions, but the Church Amendment protected
medical professionals’ right to not be involved in such procedures by insist-
ing that healthcare entities receiving federal funds could not force their
employees to perform or assist at abortions.134  The Coats-Snowe Amend-
ment protects medical students who object to performing abortions from dis-
crimination.135  And the Hyde-Weldon Amendment prevents the
government from discriminating against healthcare institutions that refuse to
offer abortion services.136
There is little reason the law should not provide the same protections for
religion and conscience in the marriage arena as it has in the abortion arena.
After all, accommodations for pro-life beliefs affirm that opposition to
becoming complicit in abortion is not tantamount to discrimination on the
basis of sex.  As Anderson notes, “[p]ro-life convictions need not flow from or
communicate hostility to women.  A ruling in favor of a pro-life citizen sends
no message about patriarchy or female subordination; it says simply that pro-
life citizens are not bigots and that the state may not exclude them from
public life.”137  Similarly, First Amendment protections “for people who act
according to the conjugal understanding of marriage need not undermine
any of the valid purposes of laws that ban discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation . . . because support for conjugal marriage is not anti-gay.”138
While it is beyond the scope of this Note to explore in detail the possible
statutory schemes that could be enacted to protect people like Phillips or the
O’Connors, in this arena the state “follows the best of our traditions” when it
“respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public
service to their spiritual needs,” as the Supreme Court wrote in Zorach v.
Clauson.139
Remembering that the default presumption should be in favor of
exemptions and accommodations for religion and conscience,140 the appro-
133 See BRADLEY, supra note 14, at 3.
134 See Anderson & Girgis, supra note 28, at 122.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Anderson, supra note 63, at 126.
138 Id. at 137.
139 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
140 Religion is singled out for special treatment in the Constitution and thus has the
firmest basis for zealous protection. See Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation, Establishment,
and Freedom of Religion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39, 42 (2014) (“The text of the Constitu-
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priate question to ask in evaluating complicity claims is this: Are accommoda-
tions and exemptions being extended “in as many cases and to as many
persons and entities as possible, in a sincere effort to welcome religious
minorities, objectors, and dissenters as fully as we can into what Justice
Harlan called ‘the dignity and glory of American citizenship’?”141  The bal-
ancing of interests in cases like Masterpiece weighs heavily in favor of protect-
ing the goods of religion and conscience.  Legislation like the First
Amendment Defense Act or a model statute proposed by a group of notable
scholars of religious liberty indicate the correct balance: individuals and busi-
nesses should not be required to provide goods or services that assist or pro-
mote the celebration of any marriage if doing so would cause the provider to
violate sincerely held religious beliefs, unless it would cause serious hardships
to the party seeking marriage and they could not otherwise obtain similar
goods or services.142  Such a statutory solution provides broader relief than is
available under free speech doctrines, since the strongest arguments in
defense of complicity claims on free speech grounds are those based on the
rule against compelled speech and apply to cases of expressive products,
which is a narrower category of cases than is covered by the universe of com-
plicity claims.  And it provides broader, more explicit relief than is available
to complicity claimants under the Free Exercise Clause.143
tion treats religion as ‘special’ and so governments may, should, and sometimes must treat
it as ‘special’ too.”).  But rights of conscience ought to be respected as well given their
connection to the good of integrity.
141 Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and—and Among—Civil Rights: Separa-
tion, Toleration, and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 498 (2015) (quoting Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
142 The text describes the model statute proposed by religious liberty scholars as related
by Andrew Koppelman.  Koppelman, supra note 66, at 639.  The First Amendment Defense
Act would prohibit the federal government from taking discriminatory action against a
person on the basis that such person believes or acts in accordance with a religious belief
or moral conviction that marriage should be between one man and one woman. See First
Amendment Defense Act, H.R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015).
143 The Eighth Circuit’s discussion of the Free Exercise Clause in its decision in Tele-
scope Media is illuminating.  The court noted that complicity claims do not present typical
free exercise claims.  “Those seeking relief under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment will ordinarily argue that their religion requires them to engage in conduct
that the government forbids or forbids certain conduct that the government requires.”
Telescope Media Grp. v. Lucero, 936 F.3d 740, 759 (8th Cir. 2019).  When a case falls into
one of those two categories, courts simply apply “the rule that neutral, generally applicable
laws that incidentally burden ‘a particular religious practice’ do not have to be ‘justified by
a compelling governmental interest.’” Id. (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)).  But complicity claims do not fall into
either category—claimants in such cases argue that they are prevented from freely exercis-
ing their religious beliefs because the relevant law requires them to show support for same-
sex marriage or else refrain from engaging in their chosen profession. Id. at 758–59.  The
court permitted the plaintiffs to develop their free exercise argument on remand because
their allegation that the state law burdened religiously motivated speech rather than conduct
rendered the claim a hybrid-rights one, in which “‘the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction
with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech,’ can ‘bar[ ] application
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CONCLUSION
This Note began by pondering what it would mean for Justice Kennedy’s
words in Obergefell—that “[m]any who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong
reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosoph-
ical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here”144—to
be taken seriously in the context of claims by opponents of same-sex mar-
riage that they could not in good conscience be complicit in the solemniza-
tion or celebration of such unions.  For in his very next sentence, Justice
Kennedy complicated matters by cautioning that “when that sincere, per-
sonal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary conse-
quence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon
demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.”145  Can
these statements be reconciled?  Can “decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises” become “demean[ing] and stigmatiz[ing]” when
protected by law?  Justice Kennedy appears to leave us in a Catch-22 situation:
honoring the religious and moral convictions of those who oppose same-sex
marriage results in state-sanctioned stigmatization of same-sex attracted per-
sons, but honoring same-sex marriage in law leads to state-sanctioned stigma-
tization of religious believers.
This Note has attempted to show that there are win-win options available
that take religion and conscience seriously while not disparaging anyone’s
legal rights.  The balance of interests at stake supports robust protections for
complicity claims in the context of marriage.  Accepting this requires
digesting and accepting “the messiness of civil society.”146  Division and disa-
greement are unavoidable, but a principled pluralism nevertheless respects
the rights of association, religion, and conscience.  These rights and the
mediating institutions they foster grant vibrancy to society and help us to
flourish in pursuing human goods.  If we are able to come to peace with the
“crooked timber of free society” and recognize the state’s limited compe-
tence to resolve the variety of disagreements that are bound to arise in such a
polity,147 we can continue to respect religious liberty as our first freedom and
ensure, as the cultural landscape continues to change, that individuals like
Jack Phillips are not disparaged but continue to enjoy the “dignity and glory
of American citizenship.”148
of a neutral, generally applicable law.’” Id. at 759 (alteration in original) (quoting Emp’t
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881–82 (1990)).  The Eighth Circuit noted that it was not clear,
in any event, whether the application of the hybrid-rights doctrine would “make any real
difference in the end,” given that the free speech claim “already require[d] the application
of strict scrutiny.” Id. at 760.
144 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
145 Id.
146 Girgis, supra note 40, at 414.
147 Garnett, supra note 61, at 223.
148 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
